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CHAPTER NINE
Development and Learning: Complementary or Conflicting
Aims in Humanities Education?
Robert D. Narveson
When we in ADAPT let it be known that cognitive development as defined by Jean
Piaget was a central concern of our program, we found to our puzzlement that both high school
and university counselors started sending us all sorts of academic basket cases. It took us a long
time to figure out why. In fact the explanation did not really register with me until a short time
ago when I attended a conference on freshman composition. There I heard the term
“developmental” used in a sense quite different from the one I had found in our reading of
developmental psychology.
Perhaps I was the last person in American education to discover what I discovered at the
conference on composition, which was that in current educational usage “developmental” has
replaced “remedial” in describing programs for students with academic deficiencies. I quickly
verified that this has become common usage by examining some of the catalogues recently sent
out by textbook publishers. In the most recent McGraw-Hill catalogue of English texts, for
example, a section on developmental English leads the list, segregated from the following
sections on composition, literature, and language. Unquestionably publishers such as McGrawHill are attuned to the professions they serve, and have adapted their terminology accordingly.
A linguistic relativist, I bow to the majority and recognize this meaning of
“developmental” as legitimate, much as I have had to accept that when most people say
“disinterested” they mean “uninterested,” and not what I mean when I say “disinterested.” Still, I
cannot resist musing over this strange shift of meaning. If developmental courses are for students
who do not measure up to the norm of academic attainment, then the rest of the curriculum must
be for those who do measure up. That is, it must be for the developed. We in ADAPT are not
prepared to accept such a proposition. The findings of cognitive psychologists confirm the
anecdotal experiences of most teachers that a large number of students in American colleges do
not respond to problems demanding logical thinking in the ways that academic experience claims
is necessary for academic success. Economics students often fail successfully to translate prices
of goods in one currency into prices in another currency, or to understand supply-demand curves.
In English classes students frequently seem not to understand that when the pronoun in a poem
suddenly changes from "he" to "you", one should suspect a change in the person being referred
to. Examples from mathematics, logic, and the sciences are legion. The common lament of
teachers is, "if only our students knew how to think!" Many students apparently, need
“developmental” teaching. Whether very many of the instructional methods in common use in
American college classrooms are actually effective in teaching how to think is a matter that
Piagetian theory, as we understand it, calls into question.
Just how would teachers go about teaching students to improve their thinking? Some
philosophy professors propose that all students should be required to take a course in logic-under their tutelage. Others have tried and failed to teach logical thinking by the use of such
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excellent texts as Monroe Beardsley's Thinking Straight (1975) maintain a more skeptical
position. Somehow many students seem not to improve their thinking through the formal study
of logic. Sad experience has even led some to question whether formal logic has much to do with
intelligent thinking. There appears to be some evidence that even very young children use
inferential thinking, a form of logical thought, in the context of their everyday lives (Donaldson,
1978); and that when adults respond in unexpected, apparently illogical ways to thought
problems posed by academic researchers, it is because they conceptualize the demands of the
problem differently, though not less logically, but of agreeing on the nature of the task. Olson
(1977) cites research from which he infers that academic ways of thinking are often based upon a
print culture whereas ordinary people may be responding in ways based upon their everyday
experiences in an oral culture in which words do not signify meaning in the same way.
Questions have also been raised about an apparent overemphasis on a single kind of
thinking. Some argue that we western intellectuals are in thrall to left-brain centered modes of
discursive logical thought, neglecting the non-discursive symbolic, intuitive, gestalt-like activity
of the right brain. Those in reaction against domination by scientific, rational thought argue that
other kinds of thought are appropriate for artistic and religious thinking. This sort of argument is
not new. It has never been stated more brilliantly than by the mathematician Pascal: “The heart
has its reasons which the reason cannot know.”
In the face of all such considerations, we in ADAPT find persuasive the case made by
Piaget that there is a common thread in all human cognitive activity that can best be described as
something very like logic. In dozens of books and hundreds of articles over the last half-century
and more, Piaget has elaborated his theories about the nature of knowledge and formal properties
of the mechanisms by which knowledge is acquired at different stages in human development.
Two of the stages of cognitive development that he describes are of interest to us as teachers of
college-aged students, the concrete operational stage and the formal operational stage. At each
stage certain structures of intelligence enable their possessors to interact with their experience of
the world in certain ways. The possibilities for constructing and testing meaning are more limited
at the former stage than at the latter, which is why developmental to the latter stage must be
considered desirable.
Piaget's description of the cognitive structures distinctive to formal operational thought is
presented in elegant symbolic-logic notation (Inhelder and Piaget 1958). It is, however, no more
than a highly abstract hypothetical model of thought structures. Though one may be tempted to
take this model of thought structures to be a description of how human thinking actually gets
thought, this would be an error. Thought is always a specific activity going on in an incredibly
complex way, embedded in the total context of an ongoing reality. No successful description of
thought processes has yet been formulated. Consider the failure of the information processing
school of cognitive psychologists to construct computer programs to simulate the thought of
humans engaged in a relatively simple activity such as chess. A prodigious effort has produced
fine chess programs that can defeat all but a fraction of one percent of all the world's chess
players. No mean accomplishment. Interestingly, however, these computer chess programs do
not “think” like people. They play excellent chess, but they do not play chess the way that people
play it. The knowledge that would enable programmers to simulate human chess thinking still
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eludes them, with no breakthrough in sight. In the same fashion, metaphorical thinking, so
important to model-making in science and to creativity in art, defies human understanding.
If no model, including Piaget's, adequately explains what going on in human thinking, is
it because the common strand that Piaget proposes in all cognitive activity does not really exist?
Shall we believe, rather, that highly general rules something like those Piaget describes operate
to create the regularity we observe everywhere in human activity? As a student of literature, I am
aware of W. H. Auden's warning, “Thou shalt not commit a social science.” But we need all the
help we can get, and if a psychologist and genetic epistemologist seems to offer assistance, I am
for accepting it gratefully.
In a confusing world, folk wisdom has neatly summed up two partially valid but
conflicting insights. One folk saying would have it that “one man's meat is another man's
poison”; another tells us that “what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.” We in ADAPT
have aligned ourselves with the “sauce for everybody” crowd. We are impressed by the
accumulating evidence showing that perhaps fifty percent of American college freshmen do not
characteristically perform at the formal operational level (for citations see J. L. Petr's Chapter 6).
If we were taking the view of the “one man's meat” school, we might conclude that this does not
matter, since those students may have talents in others directions. On the other hand, those of us
in the “sauce for everybody” school wish to weight the consequences of the absence of formal
operational thinking before acquiescing to that absence with equanimity. The topic is
unfortunately too complex to explore in this context; the interested reader will find some of the
issues discussed in Wayne Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (1974). His
general position, which I find persuasive, is that the consequence of denying the efficacy of
reason in such non-scientific activities as the making of moral and aesthetic judgments is
intellectual helplessness. It seems evident that the thinking involved in the sorts of judgments
Booth describes is of the kind described by Piaget as formal operational thinking. In a
democratic society in which it is assumed that all citizens should participate in determining the
policies that affect their welfare, the desirability of all citizens exercising the most mature
thought of which they are capable also seems evident.
Piaget's cognitive developmental theory serves as our guide in constructing an
instructional program designed to encourage growth toward mature thought in all students. We
accept as a working hypothesis Piaget's claim that self-regulating reversible cognitive structures
are central to all mature thought (Piaget, 1970). That is Piaget's claim about the nature of
knowing. A second claim we accept is that every individual in the course of growing up
progresses through the same cognitive developmental stages in the same invariant sequence. I
explore implications of these claims in the remainder of this essay.
It has been mentioned that according to Piaget a person at a lower stage of cognitive
development is the master of less powerful structures of thinking than a person at a higher stage.
It is for this reason that a person's stage of development acts as an upper limit on the person's
ability to learn certain kinds of rules and strategies for ordering and testing experiences, that is,
to understand. According to Piaget, developmental level explains why a person learns, or fails to
learn. This view, to quote Piaget, “is contrary to the widely held opinion that development is a
sum of discrete learning experiences” (Piaget, 1964, p. 176). For Piaget, development is a
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process which concerns the totality of structures of knowledge. Factors that contribute to this
developmental totality include biological maturation, experience of the physical world,
interaction with other people (social transmission), and the active structuring that Piaget calls
self-regulation. Learning, on the other hand, he defines as a response to a specific occasion.
Development is spontaneous, an outcome of living. Learning, in contrast, is provoked -- by a
teacher or by an experience. Intentional learning, and learning that results from intentional
teaching, then, do contribute to development, but only in a limited way, whereas development
has everything to say about what can be learned. If this Piagetian view is accepted, one must be
very concerned about cognitive development, for development has a fundamental and crucial
relation to learning.
In Piaget's view, then, both development and learning are the result of activity by the
student, development a process concerned with total structures which are self-regulating and
reversible, and learning a more isolated response to a specific situation. The self-regulation
occurs as people mentally transform experience from one form to another and back again,
seeking to build coherent mental structures. Our effort as teachers interested in development
must be to challenge students constantly to transform the objects of their knowledge in various
ways. A consequence is that we prefer classroom strategies calling for students to be active
rather than passive. Students in ADAPT often complain that they do a lot of writing. They do
write a lot. We try to convince them -- with what success you can imagine -- that it is the nonADAPT students, who have fewer opportunities to write, who should complain. In journals and
formal papers, students are asked to formulate and reformulate their ideas about the material
under study. Most of the writing is read and commented on, but not graded, since the motive
behind the assignments is to promote development, which is a spontaneous process, rather than
learning, which is provoked. Development follows its own path according to the precise
challenge to present cognitive structures that a given individual finds in a particular experience.
Journal entries and spontaneous comments in class reveal strange twists and turns of student
thinking that no teacher could have predicted but that are necessary to the student attempting to
build coherent structures out of experience. We wish to reward students for their efforts to work
out the problems of understanding that they themselves recognize and confront, for that is the
path of development.
In thus being concerned with fostering development, we course do not dismiss the
importance for students of working out the sort of problems conventionally posed by text or
teacher--the path of learning. Our design in ADAPT is to strike a balance between activities
designed to foster development and the imposed tasks intended to inculcate learning in the
traditional sense.
There is no question that our interest in development has resulted in a reduction of the
amount of material given the students to be learned, which in fact indicates in brief the answer to
the question of my title: An emphasis on development must come at the price of a de-emphasis
of traditional learning. Hence, from the traditional viewpoint, development and learning must be
viewed as conflicting goals. From the Piagetian view, on the other hand, whatever developmental
gains students make will remain with them after specific learning is forgotten and will
furthermore permit qualitatively more advanced kinds of learning in the future. The sacrifice of
some learning activity in favor of developmental activity is therefore for the Piagetian no
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sacrifice at all, but the achievement of a desirable balance productive of long-term benefits. In
this view development and learning will be complementary goals.
Besides suggesting strategies for encouraging development, Piagetian theory indicates to
us that college students will successfully perform tasks which calls for concrete operational
thinking. For example, in many standard composition texts, one finds a division into sections
devoted to specific organizing strategies, one of which is usually comparison and contrast. Now
comparison and contrast are essentially classifying activities, which Piagetian theory tells us that
people acquire in the concrete operational stage, falling normally somewhere between the sixth
and twelfth year. Thus, from the Piagetian point of view, it would be extremely odd if
comparison and contrast should strike any college student as new and exciting possibilities. It
seems in our view to make better sense not to pretend to teach students how to use comparison
and contrast but rather to find situations in which the activity of classifying according to
comparisons and contrasts will seem to them inevitably appropriate, and then to let them have at
it. Such a situation arises in Hemingway's Farewell to Arms when Frederic Henry holds forth
about abstract and concrete terms, saying that the former are “obscene” and that only the latter
“have dignity.” Students asked to pick words from the passage for someone to write on the board
and then to suggest groupings for the words have never failed to group the words under the
headings “abstract” and “concrete,” or to list as alternative headings for the two columns
“obscene words” and “words having dignity.” These students are employing the concrete
operational scheme of multiplicative classification, of which comparison and contrast of classes
is an instance.
Most examples of situations calling for classification are less neat than the Hemingway
one. Discourse ordinarily contains an abundance of cues indicating the organization of ideas. The
classifying activity called for in understanding the order of a passage can be quite subtle and still
be within the capacities of students. Students usually find it an interesting challenge to puzzle out
the organization of a jumbled passage. One that has worked well is the “lunatic, lover, and poet”
speech in A Midsummer Night's Dream. We break this speech down into phrasal units, print the
units on three by five cards, jumble the order, and ask students to work in groups of five or so to
put the speech back in order. The abundance of cues at first results in conflicting suggestions, but
within about a half hour each group settles on a defensible order, and it will be a rare class in
which at least one of the groups does not come up with the order Shakespeare used. During the
remainder of the class period the groups compare versions and discuss the pros and cons of each.
A consensus almost always develops in favor of the order of the original. We believe that
Piaget's theory indicates this outcome.
We share with the conventional handbooks the goal of encouraging in our students the
efficient, self-conscious employment of their organizational and presentational skills. Exercises
of the sort described, in which students actively construct solutions according to abilities they
already have, seem to us superior to the handbook way of working with the notions of
comparison and contrast. By working with these exploratory exercises, students will, we believe,
increase their control of a general strategy familiar to them from other contexts.
Besides suggesting to us exercises to cultivate strategies that concrete operational
students should already posses, Piagetian theory suggests exercises calling for formal operational
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strategies that many college students employ in rudimentary or incomplete fashion if at all. One
example is the strategy of testing the truth of general propositions. Typical composition
handbooks teach that every composition should have a clear thesis, which is usually explained to
be a general proposition. By observing student strategies for deciding on the truth or
propositions, Moshman and Thompson (1979) found evidence of developmental stages
corresponding fairly closely to the Piagetian stages of concrete and formal operations. They
presented a number of undergraduates with propositions such as “If a person uses fluoride
toothpaste, she/he will have healthy teeth,” and then asked them what they would conclude from
various kinds of evidence. They found that many of the students in their sample conferred the
same proof-status on confirming examples as on disconfirming ones. For example, when asked
what they could conclude from a case of a person who used fluoride toothpaste and had cavities,
these students replied that they wanted to see more cases before drawing a conclusion. If
presented with a preponderance of confirming cases they regarded the evidence as tending to
confirm the truth of the proposition. Thus, the authors point out, confirming cases were regarded
as having equal weight with disconfirming cases.
These findings suggest a Piagetian explanation of the strategy one finds many students
wedded to when asked to write a paper with a general proposition for a thesis. Most handbooks
advise students against making absolute generalizations, indicating that a common propensity to
do so is recognized, though not many college students, one hopes, would defend a proposition in
the precise form “If a person uses fluoride toothpaste, she/he will have health teeth.” But
students do frequently in defending their general propositions use the tactic of presenting
supporting evidence only. If questioned about this, I find that few students can think of any
reason why they should want to bring up evidence calling their own proposition into question.
Moshman and Thompson note that students who weigh confirming cases equally with
disconfirming cases seem to assume a sort of democracy in the evidence, the majority rule
determining truth. This is an indication of an immature or incomplete understanding of what
makes propositions true or false.
Standard composition teaching normally fosters the strategy of defending propositions by
advancing only supporting arguments. Whether intentionally or not, in encouraging such a view
of rhetorical discourse such teaching caters to the established preference of concrete thinkers.
Moshman and Thompson cite studies showing that science teaching also typically favors this
same concrete operational way of thinking. We all probably recall from our days in science labs
that the structure of the tasks given us encouraged us to report only the data that confirmed the
scientific law we were studying. We tended either to disregard measurements that did not
confirm the law, or to add in a fudge factor, Kelly's constant, or whatever it was called wherever
you were a student, so that the figures came out “right.”
Our strategy in ADAPT classes is to attempt to undermine this assumption by treating all
general propositions that we raise for investigation as hypothetical. In ADAPT English we have
adopted a rhetoric text more in keeping than most with Piagetian constructivist epistemology.
This text, Rhetoric: Discovery and Change by Young, Becker and Pike (1970), introduces an
explicit ethical bias toward the rhetorical stance of sharing in a common search for truth. Instead
of a thesis to defend, it advocates locating a problem to explore. It speaks rather of hypotheses
than of theses. It urges the student to seek for competing or alternative explanations of

© 1982

Chapter 9, Page 6

Piagetian Programs in Higher Education

Edited, 2007

experience. Such a stance appeals to students who have reached the appropriate developmental
stage. A study by Britton and others (1978, p. 97) reports: “A new element enters writing when
the writer begins to inspect his generalizations and to make them the very subject of his
discourse...Here the writer begins to consider alternative possibilities and perhaps to weight
them.” A considerable portion of our students, however, approaching fifty percent, resist or fail
to comprehend this stance -- as Piagetian theory predicts. Since students at the concrete
operational level do not possess or have not mastered the strategy of systematically exploring all
theoretically possible cases, for them to go on searching after having found a plausible position
would be something of an unnatural act.
A low keyed but persistent questioning of the adequacy of their assumptions about truthstatus of propositions may help students to move to the next developmental level. This hope is
encouraged by work done at Harvard by William G. Perry, Jr., (1970) who on the basis of
extensive interviews of the same students at different points in their university careers elaborated
a scheme of stages of intellectual and ethical development during the college years. Perry found
many entering college student who typically think dualistically; for them every question has
unequivocal right and wrong answers. College experiences, mostly outside of the classroom, but
sometimes in humanities classes, gradually persuade most of them that such a conception is too
simplistic, and their thinking moves toward relativism, a position in which “everyone is entitled
to his own opinion,” and every answer is as good as any other. In later stages they develop
criteria for deciding between better and worse propositions even when absolute judgment is
untenable. Perry believes that in the most advanced stage, people accept the necessity of
committing themselves to the best choice available; he names this “commitment within
relativism.” The congruence with Piaget's theories is evident.
In the discussion so far I have assumed with Piaget that the characteristics of the concrete
and formal stages of cognitive development manifest themselves in every discipline and function
everywhere as a factor limiting what in every disciplinary be effectively taught. This assumption
affords the English teacher a useful strategy for responding to colleagues in other disciplines on
those frequent occasions when the charge is leveled: “If you people in English would quit
teaching literature to your students and teach composition instead, they wouldn't come out of
your courses unable to write a decent sentence.” It is true that ugly ducklings often come out of
our courses without having undergone the transformation into swans, but there's a cognitive
developmental explanation for this failing. It has long been claimed by serious students of the
problem that good writing develops hand in hand with the general maturity of the individual
(Kitzhaber, 1968). In Piagetian terms this is to say that a skill so intricate as the writing of good
English prose may well require formal operational thought schemes. But it is necessary to
translate this proposition into terms that science and math teachers can take to heart. We
therefore ask our English students to perform a task involving proportional reasoning, which
Piaget has identified as one of the schemes attained at the level of formal thought. The task we
use in the Frog Puzzle devised by Robert Karplus at the University of California-Berkeley. This
simple pencil and paper task takes only ten minutes or so of class time. The results in our
freshman English classes, both in and out of the ADAPT program, have remained remarkably
consistent over many years: only about one fourth of the students use proportional reasoning for
the task. Most of the rest use additive reasoning, which Piaget describes as a concrete operational
mode of thought, and some refuse to try at all, either on the grounds that the problem cannot be
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solved or that they are simply no good at math. (Caution: a fair number of our colleagues and
graduate students also fail to use proportional reasoning for this task. We do not therefore judge
them to be concrete operational thinkers. More about that later.) Students at the University of
Nebraska must have passed three years of high school mathematics to meet the entrance
requirements. In those three years of math instruction they have unquestionably been taught
proportional reasoning strategies time and time again. Yet many of them have failed to master
this widely applicable math skill. Thus, we conclude, when our colleagues chide us for failing to
teach writing skills, is it not a case of the pot calling the kettle black?
Through this gratifying counterattack we are able to make the serious point that neither
English teacher nor math teacher is specifically to blame for student failings if those failing
result from inadequate development of formal operational schemes.
Nevertheless it is only with extreme caution and with extensive reservations that one
should venture upon this sort of explanation. Piaget's elegant description in The Growth of
Logical Thinking of the concrete and formal stages of intellectual development invites the hoe
that by administering Piagetian tasks one may determine a global stage of development of
individual students. Experience has dashed this hope - happily, we think. It turns out that people
often think formally on some tasks and concretely on others, their performances being
influenced, apparent, by such diverse factors as motivation, familiarity, sand social conditioning
(Piaget, 1972). Thus while a person maybe said to perform at a certain developmental level on a
particular task, it is not possible to predict from that performance how the person will perform on
other tasks, particularly when the tasks are in other disciplines.
It will be clear from these sketchy examples that working out some of the implications of
Piagetian theory for an educational program such as ours offers us a continuing challenge. The
theory perhaps does more to console us for some of our failures as teachers than to tell us how
our failures may be overcome, for if the fault is in the developmental level that our students have
attained, then the fault is not in us. Our teaching, Piaget tells us, can play a role in fostering
development, but only a fairly limited role. On the other hand if we accept the challenge, we can
be more than teachers; we can be the designers of activities that allow students to engage in the
spontaneous transformations of objects in thought that are the very essence of knowledge.
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